LABOR AND THE SHERMAN ACT by unknown
LABOR AND THE SHERMAN ACT
THE recent drive by the Anti-Trust Division against building trade unions
has revived the apparent anomaly of applying an act to prevent restraints
of trade' against organizations whose effectiveness lies in their ability to
impose such restraints, at least temporarily. It is definitely established that
union activity is subject 2 to the Sherman Act;3 hence the main issue now
is the extent to which labor can go in exercising its collective strength.
4
The economic tenor of the past fifty years was largely responsible for a
steadily accumulating catalogue of punishable practices. But a period char-
acterized by a fairly consistent lack of sympathy toward labor has been
displaced by one of confused sentiments and shifting doctrine. New and
1. SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), U. S. C. §§ 1-7, 15 i. (1934).
2. Although the Act was passed primarily to check combinations of capital, it was
used against labor as early as 1893 in United States v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Coun-
cil, 54 Fed. 994 (E. D. La. 1893), aff'd, Workingmen's Amalgamated Council v. United
States, 57 Fed. 85 (C. C. A. 5th, 1893). The Supreme Court confirmed this interpreta-
tion in Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 (1908). Labor's hopes of exemption from the
prohibitions of the Act of 1890 were raised high by the passage of the Clayton Act, only
to be rudely jolted by the Supreme Court's emasculation of the labor sections. § 6 was
held not to exempt a union from accountability where it departs from its "normal and
legitimate objects," while the attempt in § 20 to restrict the issuance of injunctions was
rendered nugatory by narrow definitions of a "labor dispute." Duplex Printing Press Co.
v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921) ; American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades
Council, 257 U. S. 184 (1921). See FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LAIBOR INJUNTION
(1930) 142 et seq.; BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN ACT (1930) 99 el seq.; WiTrrTE,
THE GOVERNMENT IN LABOR DisPUTEs (1932) 66 ct seq.
3. The most complete and searching analysis of Congress' intent to include labor
within the Sherman Act appears in BERMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, 3 et seq. Professor
Berman reaches the result that Congress did not intend the Act to cover labor organiza-
tions. Opposite conclusions are reached in MASON, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE LAW
(1925) 119 et seq., and in Emery, Labor Organizations and the Sherman Act (1912) 20
J. POL. Ecox. 599. Realistic observers have pointed out the futility of seeking a final
answer to the "intent" of Congress, and indicate that Congress purposely left the inter-
pretation of the ambiguous words of the statute to the courts. FRANKFURTER AND GREENE,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 8, n. 36; Shulman, Book Review (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 831;
Landis, Book Review (1931) 44 HARV. L. REV. 875.
4. Despite the unbroken succession of cases interpreting the Sherman Act and §6
of the Clayton Act, labor leaders still insist that unions are not, and never were intended
to be, subject to anti-trust prosecution. See letter of William Green to Attorney General
Murphy in N. Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1939, p. 30, col. 4; Sherman Act and Labor Unions
(1939) 5 LAB. REL. REP. 316. It seems very doubtful, however, that the Court will re-
verse its interpretation so as to exclude labor. Cf. Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 63
(1938). In the recent case of United States v. Borden Co., 7 U. S. L. WEEK 665 (U. S.
1939) the Supreme Court held that the question of whether the Anti-Trust Acts apply
to unions "is not open on this appeal." The preferable approach for labor would be to
meet the issues squarely and attempt to limit the application of the Act by restricting
the scope of the interstate commerce clause and expanding the sphere of "legitimate"
activity.
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contradictory factors have appeared in the form of a popular and governmental
approval of collective bargaining and a growing dissatisfaction with inter-
union conflict; in an anti-injunction statute and an attempt to apply to labor
an extended concept of interstate commerce. In an effort to strike a balance
between a benevolent approach toward labor and effective prosecution of
"illegitimate" union devices, the Anti-Trust Division has obtained a number
of labor indictments.5 This Comment will attempt to evaluate the soundness
of this policy by analyzing the legal and other issues which are involved in
the application of the Sherman Act to labor.
A survey of anti-trust doctrine as applied to unions illustrates the manner
in which a decision on the jurisdictional point of interstate commerce fades
into and is combined with a determination on the merits of the union activity.
The Supreme Court has gradually staked out the boundaries0 of an illegal
restraint of trade 7 to include a direct and substantial burden on interstate
commerce -from which the requisite criminal intent will be inferred ;8 and
an indirect burden - where actual intent to restrain0 is discernible.10 Intent
has been inferred in those cases where there were disturbances of the actual
passage of goods or instrumentalities in interstate commerce. This category
-covering such practices as strikes of transportation workers, 1 ' interference
with interstate carriers'12 and direct stoppage of interstate goods'3-fits
easily within the doctrine of direct restraints and has been subjected to rigid
5. See notes 86-89 infra. Since § 6 of the Clayton Act exempts unions u'hen layw-
fully carrying out their legitimate objectives, liability under the Anti-Trust Law,-s is
determined by setting the limits of lawful means and lawful objects.
6. Section 1 of the Sherman Act states: "Every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
states, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal . . ."
7. A conspiracy, the label usually attached to labor activities wvhich violate the act,
is traditionally defined as ". . . a combination of tvo or more persons by coneerted
action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself crim-
inal or unlawful by criminal or unlawful means." See Duplex Printing Press Co. v.
Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 465 (1921); Pettibone v. United States, 149 U. S. 197, 203
(1893) ; Jones' Case, 4 B. & Ad. 345, 349 (1832). See Terborgh, The Application of the
Sherman Act to Trade Union Activities (1929) 37 J. PoL- Ecozz. 203, at 205, for a discus-
sion of the implications of this doctrine as used against labur unions.
8. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 (1903); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,
254 U. S. 443 (1921).
9. Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 268 U. S. 295 (19235).
10. Even though there is an ultimate objective to gain a legal end, no immunity ob-
tains if the activities do in fact restrain commerce. See Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Jutrncy-
men Stonecutters' Ass'n. 274 U. S. 37, 47 (1927).
11. Amalgamated Workingmen's Council v. United States, 57 Fed. 85 (C. C. A. 5th,
1893) ; United States v. Ry. Employees' Dep't, 290 Fed. 978 (N. D. Ill. 1923); Clements
v. United States, 297 Fed. 206 (C. C. A. 9th. 1924).
12. Williams v. United States, 295 Fed. 302 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923); Vandell v. United
States, 6 F. (2d) 188 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
13. O'Brien v. United States, 290 Fed. 185 (C. C. A. 6tlh, 1923); Buyer v. Guillan,
271 Fed. 65 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921) ; United States v. Norris, 255 Fed. 423 (N. D. I11. 1918).
1940]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol, 49: 518
control by the courts.' 4 Intent has likewise been inferred from obstructions
to the marketing, installation or use of goods which have already entered
or normally would have entered interstate commerce. Such restraints, which
include the various manifestations of the so-called "secondary boycott,"' 1
represent the most wide-flung and controversial of labor practices. 10 The
Supreme Court has resorted in these cases to the rather nebulous rationale
that the union activity was directed against the actual sale or flow or price
of the product itself.1'
On the other hand, restraints of production have been considered primarily
indirect burdens' 8 on interstate commerce. 10 Consequently, their proscrip-
14. A case in which labor used the Sherman Act for its own benefit fits within this
category. In Anderson v. Shipowners' Ass'n, 272 U. S. 359. (1926), seamen had an em-
ployers' restrictive agreement, relating to employment, declared an illegal conspiracy in
restraint of trade. The court's remark, at 364, that both seamen and ships are "instru-
mentalities of, and intended to be used in, interstate and foreign commerce," may have
some jurisdictional significance in the Anti-Trust drive in the building industry. See
note 103 infra.
15. "Boycott" is a word "of vague signification, and no accurate and exclusive defini-
tion has ...ever been given." Hough, J., in Gill Engraving Co. v. Doerr, 214 Fed. 111,
118 (S. D. N. Y. 1914). For purposes of clarity of thought, it is desirable to dispense
with the use of the term "secondary boycott" in analysis. See Hellerstcin, Secondary
Boycotts in Labor Disputes (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 341-342; FRANKFURTER AND GREENE,
THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930) 42 et seq.; OAKES, ORGANIZED LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL
DISPUTES (1927) 602 et seq.
16. The union activity was declared illegal in the following cases: Loewe v, Law-
lor, 208 U. S. 274 (1908); Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U. S. 522 (1915) (attempts to per-
suade customers of employee not to buy unfair goods); Duplex Printing Press Co. v.
Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921) (attempts to discourage the purchase of nou-union goods
by threatening strikes) ; Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274
U. S. 37 (1927) (strikes against the handling of non-union goods); United States v.
Brims, 272 U. S. 549 (1926) (agreements between employers and the union to prevent
the sale of out of state non-union goods). But in Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin,
289 U. S. 103 (1933), the Court held that a strike for a union shop, although affecting
the amount of steel shipped into the state, was not subject to the Sherman Act.
17. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 467 (1921); Bedford
Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U. S. 37, 46 (1927) ; TAFT, TUB
ANTI-TRUST AcT AND THE SUPRFME COURT (1914) 96-98; BERMAN, LABOR AND THE
SHERMAN AcT (1930) 202.
18. "The mere reduction in the supply of an article to be shipped in interstate com-
merce by the illegal or tortious prevention of its manufacture or production is ordinarily
an indirect and remote obstruction to that commerce." Chief Justice Taft in Coronado
Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 268 U. S. 295, 310 (1925).
19. In National Association of Window Glass Manufacturers v. United States, 263
U. S. 403 (1923), involving a combination of manufacturers and the union to fix prices
and stagger output, the court looked to the economic structure of the industry, recog-
nized that the agreement had a justifiable purpose, and held that there was "no con-
bination in unlawful restraint of trade." In Rambusch Decorating Co. v. Brotherhood
of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers of America, 105 F. (2d) 134 (C. C. A. 2d,
1939), cert. denied, Oct. 9, 1939, Case 290, the court upheld a provision requiring non-
resident contractors to pay the higher rate of wages and accord the shorter work-day
of either the contractor's home or the place of the job.
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tion has required ascertainment of an actual illegal intent2 0 - defined in terms
of geography. Thus a strike against a manufacturer shipping into interstate
commerce has been held not within the jurisdiction of the Act so long as
restricted to the betterment of local working conditions,2 1 but within the
jurisdiction of the Act and illegal if instituted for the protection of union
workers and producers in other states.2
An attempt to extract meaning from these formalistic distinctions makes
it evident that the terms "direct" and "intent," rather than being instruments
of analysis, are merely statements of results.2 3 What seems to be a test is
merely a rationalization of the judicial doctrine of condemning "secondary
boycotts" outright, while recognizing strikes for better working conditions
or for a closed shop as "legitimate" 2-4 union activities.2  Yet when a local
20. It is an obvious truism that labor, when employing concerted action, rarely has
as its direct object the restraint of trade per se, but rather hopes to ameliorate wcirling
conditions or strengthen the union. It likewise seems evident that the court is using the
word "intent" in twro different senses. In those cases where the Court infers intent from
directness of restraint, intent is used not in the subjective sense of a planned result, but rather
with reference to deliberate doing of an act with knowledge of its character. Converse-
ly, in those cases where the Court feels constrained to look beyond incidental restraints
to discover purposes, i.e., purposes to restrain interstate transactions, they are definitely
concerned with planned results. The two Coronado cases, discussed in note 22 infra,
seem adequate proof of this. Cf. Landis, Book Review (1931) 44 -Anv. L. Rm,. 875,
876, n. 8. To discover this intent, however, the Court need not conduct a psychological
search for malice and motive, as Berman assumes in his criticism of the intent doctrine
at 238-241. Much appears in direct evidence, to be accepted and weighed according to
the attitude of the court.
21. United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344 (1922);
United Leather Workers v. Herkert and 'Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U. S. 457 (1924). Cf.
Industrial Ass'n of San Francisco v. United States, 26S U. S. 64 (1925); Levering &
Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U. S. 103 (1933).
22. Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 263 U. S. 295 (1925);
cf. Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U. S. 37 (1927). In
the second Coronado case, the Court found direct evidence that the strikes had been
called to aid union mines in Oklahoma, Kansas and other neighboring states. This evi-
dence of intent was lacking in the first Coronado case, which was dismissed. It also
appeared, and was given some weight as an aid in determining intent, that the produc-
tion of the mine was 5,000 tons per day rather than the 5,000 tons per veek figure used
in the first Coronado case. It is highly doubtful, however, that this factor alone would
have induced the Court to change its mind. See 263 U. S. 295, at 309, where the court
mentions its denial of a rehearing on the sole basis of capacity.
23. BERA AN, LABOR AND THE SHERmAN Ac" (1930) contains the most complete dis-
cussion and citation of labor cases under the act. See also Terborgh, The Application of
the Sherm);a Act to Trade Union Actiiies (1929) 37 J. Poa- Eco:N. 203; Comment
(1935) 35 CoL. L. REv. 1072; WrrrE, THE GovzmEnT In L,=ao DisPurns (1932);
Quigg, Trade Union Activities and the Sherman Act (Jan., 1930) 147 Am-,.s 51. The
classification of types of interferences is similar to that used by Terborgh and Berman.
24. "Union was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on equality with their
employer. They united to exert influence upon him and to leave him in a body in order
by this inconvenience to induce him to make better terms with them. They were with-
holding their labor of economic value to make him pay for what they thought it was
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strike takes on the aspect of concerted union activity over a number of states,
it not only becomes subject to the jurisdiction of the Act but also becomes
illegal -even though its effect on interstate commerce is exactly the same.20
It seems fair to assume that the Court's concern so far has been with ex-
cessive control by a widespread labor organization.
27
The arbitrariness of these results has given rise to outbursts against
judicial hocus-pocus 28 and to the criticism that, although the "rule of reason"
has been on the books since 1911,29 the Supreme Court has consistently
refused to consider the reasonableness of a labor practice.30 It is true that
once a direct restraint or actual proof of intent has been established, it has
followed automatically, without discussion of reasonableness, that the activity
worth. The right to combine for such a purpose has in many years not been denied by
any court. The strike became a lawful instrument in a lawful economic struggle or
competition between employers and employees as to the share or division between them
of the joint product of labor and capital." Chief Justice Taft in American Steel Foun-
dries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184, 209 (1921). See also Heller-
stein, Secondary Boycotts in Labor Disputes (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 341, 343.
25. Even if the strike was accompanied by force, the Court refused to apply the
Sherman Act. In the first Coronado case, the union resorted to violence, murder, and
arson. The Herkert controversy was marked by illegal picketing and intimidation. Vio-
lence seems to be a decisive factor, however, in the determination of the legality of rail-
road strikes under the Sherman Act. See LANDIS, CASES ON LABOR LAW (1934 ed. and
1937 Supp.) 521, n. 1; TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT (1914)
97. Railroad labor relations at present are handled largely under the Railway Labor Act
of 1926 and the amendments of 1934. 44 STAT., pt. 2, 577 (1926), 48 STAT. 1185 (1934),
45 U. S. C. §§ 151-164 (1934). See Magruder, A Hall Century of Legal Influence Upon
the Development of Collective Bargaining, (1937) 50 HARv. L. REV. 1071, 1087.
26. Strikes for unionization, which spread over more than one state, have been penal-
ized in the lower courts. International Organization of United Mine Workers of America
v. Red Jacket Consol. Coal & Coke Co., 18 F. (2d) 839 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927), cert. denied,
275 U. S. 536 (1927).
27. This conclusion is borne out by the language of the Court in Duplex Printing
Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, at 477 (1921), and Bedford Cut Stone Co. v.
Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U. S. 37, at 54 (1927).
28. Terborgh, loc. cit. supra note 23, at 224. His point that the court's reliance on
intent results in a lack of correlation between illegality and effect on commerce is well
taken. In pushing his argument to an extreme, he maintains that a nationwide strike in
a closed shop industry, which completely stopped the movement of the product, would
not result in the union being "chargeable with an intent to restrain commerce." How-
ever, the more likely result in such a situation would be a conclusive presumption of
intent based on directness of restraint.
29. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 56-58 (1911) ; United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106, 178-180 (1911). See Comment (1932) 32 COL. L.
REv. 291.
30. BERMAN, op. cit. supra note 23, 228 et seq. Berman indicates the one exception,
National Ass'n of Window Glass Mfrs. v. United States, 263 U. S. 403 (1923), which
involved a manufacturers' association as well as a labor union. See note 19 supra. This
statement refers only to majority opinions. Brandeis' dissents in the Duplex and Bedford
cases stress the reasonable nature of the labor activity.
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was illegal.31 But it is apparent that this is due to the confusion of "juris-
diction" with "merits," for there is an inarticulate premise in each one of
those cases that the practice was "illegitimate" and "unreasonable."! 2
M~uch of the explanation for this judicial ban of widespread union activity
lies in the economic temper of the times. Within the broad scope of inter-
pretation offered by the general words of the Statute, the Supreme Court
could have chosen almost any path. Significantly, until fairly recently, a
dominant majority of the public and the judiciary were prone to view with
alarm, and even with active resentment, the collective bargaining practices
of labor.33 The union was regarded as a rather alien and vicious institution,
whereas employers' property rights were conceived of as absolute.- Con-
sequently, although labor unions per se were granted both statutory5 and
judicial 36 recognition, most of their weapons for combating or inducing
31. See Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U. S. 37,
53-54 (1927); Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 263 U. S. 295,
310 (1925) ; Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 468 (1921).
32. See Brandeis' dissents in the Duplex and Bedford cases, note 31 supra. Funda-
mentally, this is the issue on which the Supreme Court divided.
33. "'Much as the American middle classes, notably the farmers, vere prone in de-
pression to go on crusades against "mbnopoly," they were also ever ready to flare up in
resentment against labor insisting on maintaining wages and other standards and going
on strike. Consequently, when the judiciary protected by its decisions the employer
against legislation and unionism, it was not acting as a mere "tool" of a minority but
reflected the strongly held view of the majority in the American community. Evidently,
by these supports, the American employers' will to freedom from unionism was kept from
weakening." PERLMAN AND TArr, HISTORY OF LABOR IN THnE UNITED STATES, 1396-1932
(1932) 622.
34. See, for example, U. S. STRIKE . REronR oN' THE CHICAGO STI-E or-0
JuNE-JULY, 1894 (1894) XXVI, XLVII; 1 COM-M. ON INDUSTaIAL RE.LATIO:S, FINAL
REpoRT, SEx. Doc- No. 415, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916). These reports are discussed
in Magruder, A Half Century of Legal Influence Upon the Development of Collective
Bargaining (1937) 50 HAuv. L. REv. 1071. The language used by lower court judges,
when dealing with employer-employee controversies, reflects the temper of the times. See
'My Maryland Lodge, No. 186, Internat'1 Ass'n of Machinists v. Adt, 100 Md. 233, 59
Atl. 721 (1905) ; Branson v. Industrial Workers of the World, 30 Xev. 270, 95 Pac. 354
(1908). Similarly, the conservatively worded opinions of the Supreme Court indicate
a lack of sympathy with union objectives. Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161 (1903) ;
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1 (1915); Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245
U. S. 229 (1917) ; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312 (1921); cf. American Steel Foun-
dries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184, 269 (1921). The intellectual
and social background of the judges who decided the Sherman Act cases is also an im-
portant factor in evaluating the decisions. Professor Fetter, in Democracy and Monop-
oly, Stafford Little Lectures at Princeton University (1939), states: "The majority
of the appointees to the Supreme Court from the '80's till, say, 1910, -ere distinguished
corporation lawyers, who came to the Court with the long inbred habit of advocates and
defenders of the new business corporations rather than of the public rights:'
35. Section 6 of the Clayton Act, 38 STr.. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 17 (1934).
36. The famous opinion of Chief justice Shaw of Massachusetts in Commonwealth
v. Hunt, 4 Met. 111 (M6ass. 1842) is the landmark for this principle. The Supreme
Court reaffirmed it in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 465 (1921).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49: 518
employer action were blunted by the Act of 1890.11 It would seem that the
Supreme Court, in deriving its rules, applied harsher doctrine against labor
combinations8 8 than against capital combinations.8 9 Mr. Justice Brandeis
put it clearly in his famous Bedford Stone dissent:
"The Sherman Act was held in United States v. United States
Steel Corporation . . . to permit capitalists to combine in a single
corporation 50%o of the steel industry in the United States, dominat-
ing the trade through its vast resources. The Sherman Law was
held in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co. . . . to permit
capitalists to combine in another corporation practically the whole
shoe machinery industry of the country, necessarily giving it a
position of dominance over shoe manufacturing in America. It
would, indeed, be strange if Congress had by the same Act willed
to deny to members of a small craft of workingmen the right to
cooperate in simply refraining from work, when that course was
the only means of self-protection against a combination of militant
and powerful employers. I cannot believe that Congress did so."140
Present developments in the position of labor under the Sherman Act
must operate upon this fairly settled judicial doctrine. A further extension
of the Act to encompass violent strikes against production has recently been
Labor was caused alarm by the decision of District Judge Dayton in Hitchman Coal &
Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 202 Fed. 512 (N. D. W. Va. 1912), declaring the United Mine
Workers an unlawful combination under the Sherman Act. This decision, which stands
alone, was reversed in Mitchell v. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co., 214 Fed. 685 (C. C. A.
4th, 1914).
37. If a conspiracy to restrain trade is found to exist, all means used to promote
that conspiracy are illegal, even though innocent in themselves. This concept affords an
instrument for preventing such activities as the check-off and the most peaceful forms
of persuasion and picketing. Nevertheless, the courts have hesitated to include peaceful
acts within their injunctions. See BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN Acr (1930) 206-
210; Terborgh, The Application of the Sherman Law to Trade Union Activities (1929)
37 J. POL. EcoN. 203, 206. For a summary of the various trade union activities declared
illegal under the Sherman Law, see BERMAN, at 191-192.
38. The Court's preoccupation with subjective intent in labor cases has no counter-
part in industrial cases, where it has looked mostly to effects on interstate commerce to
discover intent to restrain. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U. S.
290, 342 (1897) ; Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211, 243 (1899) ;
United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525, 543 (1913) ; cf. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United
States, 246 U. S. 231, 238 (1918). See also Jones, Historical Development of the Law
of Business Competition (1926) 36 YALE L. J. 207, 225; Handler, Industrial Mergers
and the Anti-Trust Laws (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 179, 253; Bishop, Crimual Intent as
Applied to Conspiracy Under the Sherman Act (1925) 11 VA. L. REv. 417; Comment
(1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 1072, 1081.
39. See Powell, Commerce, Congress, and the Supreme Court (1926) 26 COL. L.
REv. 521, 545-546; Frey, The Double Standard in Applying the Sherman Act (1928) 18
Am. LAB. Lw. REv. 302; Corwin, The Anti-Trust Acts and the Constitutiot (1932) 18
VA. L. REv. 355, 373-378; Comment (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 1072.
40. Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U. S. 37, 65
(1927).
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urged, on the basis of the expanded concept of interstate commerce laid
down in the NLRB cases.4 1 From the premise that these cases determine
what activities in relation to interstate commerce come witlin federal control,
it is glibly deduced that a strike within the cognizance of the National Labor
Relations Act is a fortiori subject to the operation of the Sherman Act.
The consequence claimed from this line of reasoning is that every strike
in any factory that ships into interstate commerce, if accompanied by violence,
is exposed to the criminal and treble damage penalties of the Sherman Act.
This doctrine was exploded in the latest version of the Apex controversy,42
where the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied a treble
damage action against a union for conducting a sit-down strike in a factory
that shipped into interstate commerce. 43 The court relied on tile difference
between the use of the word "affect" in the Wagner Act and of "restrain"
in the Sherman Act to prove that, in cases arising under the latter, com-
merce "must not only be affected but also must be restrained and restrained
41. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1
(1937); N. L. R. B. v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U. S. 49 (1937); N. L. R. B. v.
Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U. S. 58 (1937). See also Santa Cruz Fruit
Packing Co. v. N. L. R. B., 303 U. S. 453 (1938); Consolidated Edison Co. Y. N. L.
R. B., 305 U. S. 197 (1938); N. L. R. B. v. Fainblatt, 306 U. S. 601 (1939).
42. Leader v. Apex Hosiery Co., 5 LAn. REt. REP. 375 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939), rerzg,
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, C. C. H. Labor Law Serv. f 18,353 (E. D. Pa. 1939). This
case has passed through several stages, attracting much legal and popular attention. In
1937, a suit for an injunction under the Sherman Act against a sit-down strike %as
denied by Judge Kirkpatrick in the district court. 20 F. Supp. 138 (E. D. Pa. 1937).
Upon appeal to the Third Circuit, Judges Davis, Buffington and Dickinson sitting, the
judgment was reversed and an injunction granted on the ground that the XLRB cases
had extended the interstate commerce concept 90 F. (2d) 155 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937). It
was appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed the injunction decree and remanded
the case because the controversy had become moot. Leader v. Apex Hosiery Co., 302
U. S. 656 (1937) (memorandum opinion). In 1939, a suit for triple damages was brought
before Judge Kirkpatrick. His rulings on point of law were based on the Circuit Court's
earlier opinion in the injunction suit, and the jury returned a verdict for !P-37,090. On
appeal to the circuit court, Judges Biggs, Clark and Mavis sitting, the verdict was set
aside on the grounds that there was no violation of the Sherman Act. In pointing out
that the company's remedy for damage lay in the state courts, the court said: "In the
injunction proceedings this court concluded that because the appellants committed un-
lawful acts they were therefore guilty of a conspiracy in restraint of trade. This conclu-
sion we now think is erroneous." The case has been noted in (1939) 39 COL L. Ray.
1247, (1937) 51 H-Av. L. Ray. 169, (1937) 15 N. Y. U. L. Q. RE%. 135, (1937) 5 U. or
CL L. REv. 149.
43. The court held that both the strike against production and the refusal to allow
the shipments of orders to leave the factory had only incidental effects on interstate
commerce. The ruling on the latter goes farther than the first Coronado and Hcr:crl
cases. Judge Biggs based it on the principle of de sninizs nion curat lex in that the
stopping of shipments had only a slight effect on interstate commerce, and distinguished
former cases on the ground that here the goods were not as yet in motion. See United
Leather Workers Internat'l Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U. S. 457, 463
(1924).
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into an unreasonable degree." 44 Although a distinction such as this seems
little more than logomachy, it does tend to emphasize the formal difference
between the two statutes in regard to the substantiality of the effect of the
intrastate act on interstate commerce. 4 , It can be argued that this juris-
dictional difference is inherent in the two laws, which are widely divergent
in purpose, operation and scope. In setting up the Wagner Act 40 to "diminish
the causes of labor disputes," Congress intended to exploit its interstate
commerce power to the full constitutional limit.41 When deciding that certain
intrastate activities so affect interstate commerce as to come within the
control of the Federal Government, the Supreme Court has served merely
to set the bounds of that power. Contrariwise, in the Sherman Act labor
cases, the Court was interpreting a statute in which Congress did not exer-
cise the full measure of its control over interstate commerce. 48 Even if the
artificial distinction between "affect" and "restrain" is abandoned, and a
local strike is held to affect or restrain interstate commerce directly, it does
not inevitably follow that the Sherman Act is applicable. "Interstate com-
merce" is not to be treated in vacuo as an abstract conception when deter-
mining the jurisdictional scope of a statute. Rather it is to be interpreted
in the light of each statute and its subject matter. The Supreme Court has
recognized that the Wagner Act, in its effort to eliminate certain recurring
practices that lead to industrial strife, extends to almost every strike that
44. The case was decided solely on jurisdictional grounds. "Unreasonable" here refers
to quantitative effects on commerce, although usually it relates to the nature of the activ-
ity. Very often, the two usages are confused and combined, both in the mind of the judge
and in the opinion.
45. The case of Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc. v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, 7
U. S. L. WEEK 622 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939), which came down on the same day as the Apex
case, has been thought by some commentators to be in conflict with the Ape.x rationale.
(1939) 7 U. S. L. WEEK 628; (1939) 5 LAB. RE. REP. Analysis (Dec. 4th). At the
time of writing, a full copy of the decision is not available for purposes of comparison,
Digest-summaries of the opinion, however, indicate that there are differences between
the two cases-such as type of dispute and type of activity employed-that would enable
them to be distinguished.
46. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. §§ 151-166 (Supp. 1938).
47. See National Labor Relations Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U. S. 601, 607; Magruder,
loc. cit. supra note 25, at 1090.
48. The Sherman Act decisions recognized that Congress could control certain intra-
state activities which, if permitted, would restrain interstate commerce. Coronado Coal
Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 268 U. S. 295 (1925). But, in denying the
claims of the company in the Herkert case, Chief Justice Taft agreed: "The natural,
logical and inevitable result will be that every strike in any industry or even in any sin-
gle factory will be within the Sherman Act and subject to federal jurisdiction provided
any appreciable amount of its product enters into interstate commerce. We cannot think
that Congress intended any such result in the enactment of the Anti-Trust Act or that
the decisions of this Court warrant such construction." United Leather Workers Inter-
nat'l Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U. S. 457, 471 (1924). See also (1939)
39 COL. L. REv. 1247; McLAUGHLIN, CASES ON THE FEDERAL ANTi-TRUST LAWS oF Tn:i
UNITED STATES (1930) 81, note.
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affects interstate commerce, regardless of whether it affects 5% or 95%
of the commerce of the particular industry which enters interstate channels.
The Sherman Act, on the other hand, is concerned with the effect of the
single strike before the court, not with the cumulative effect of all such
strikes. Consequently, although the strike in the Apex factory may have
been sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the Wagner Act, it did not
sufficiently affect or restrain commerce, in the absence of a non-local intent,
to come within the Sherman Act. Stated in somewhat different form: the
intent requisite to a conspiracy to restrain commerce need not be conclusively
presumed from a strike against production. Nor should the element of force
and violence be sufficient to bring the strike within the scope of the Act. In
considering the jurisdictional problem of the actual effect of the strike upon
interstate commerce, the presence of force is an irrelevant factor.4 9 Likewise,
as an issue of fact, a violent sit-down strike is no more evidence of "intent"
to restrain trade than a peaceful walkout or peaceful picketing.o As a
matter of precedent, although the Supreme Court has uniformly banned acts
of violence in its Sherman Act injunctions, the number of brickbats thrown
has had little relevance in determining the.fundamental issue of the existence
of an illegal intent to restrain interstate commerce. 1
It is noteworthy that in the NLRB cases, Chief Justice Hughes did not
attempt to overturn the Sherman Act decisions. Indeed, he relied heavily
on them as illustrating "both the purpose and the limitation"' of the com-
49. See note 25 supra.
50. In the first Apex case, the circuit court seemed to base its conclusive presumption
of intent, in part at least, on a lawless sit-down strike. Ape% Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
90 F. (2d) 155, 160 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937). The district judge in Wilson O Co. v. Birl,
in interpreting the Apex case, limited this presumption solely to the lawless sit-down
strike, holding that the reduction in the supply of goods shipped into interstate commerce
caused by a peaceful strike does not give rise to such intent. If this interpretation is
accurate, the first Apex rule represented a departure from precedent and seems clearly
wrong. Even if the union members are held to have committed crimes and to have in-
tended what they did, it does not follow that they intended to restrain interstate conmere.
If, however, the rule of the first Apex case was (1) intent to restrain is crinclusively
presumed from the direct restraint caused by a strike at production, (2) a sit-down stril:e
or other illegal means makes the restraint illegal, then it cannot.be passed off so easily.
It can be attacked, as it correctly was in the second opinion of the circuit court, on the
jurisdictional ground that there is no direct restraint at all for purposes of the Sherman
Act. The argument can also be made (but not as effectively) that, admitting a restraint
of trade, it is not unreasonable despite the presence of illegal means which can be punished
by the state courts.
51. In the Bedford case, the union members were innocent of acts of violence or
intimidation. Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Ass'n, 274 U. S. 37
(1927). In the Duplex case, the Court said: "It is settled by these decisions that such
a strike produced by peaceful persuasion is as much within the prohibition as one accom-
plished by force or threats of force." Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S.
443, 467 (1921). Nevertheless, the presence of force probably has some influence, perhaps
unconscious, in the determination of the reasonableness of a strike.
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merce power.52 The principles of these two lines of cases are complementary
and can exist side by side in the federal system. A finding that Congress
can control all aspects of interstate commerce is no basis for holding that
a conspiracy exists under the Sherman Act - an interpretation that would
substitute the Federal Government for the states as the final arbiter of purely
local strikes which impinge upon interstate commerce. 3 The Court is by
no means forced into the ironical position of using its ratification of the
Wagner Act as the means of further exposing unions to the Sherman Act.6"
In decided contrast with this attempt to extend the Sherman Act definition
of interstate commerce is the legislative limitation on the courts' equity powers
in labor disputes. Since 1932, the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 6 forbidding the
issuance of enjoining orders against such normal labor activities as peaceful
publicity and picketing,"6 has stood as a more or less effective breakwater
against the wave of injunctions that formerly followed labor difficulties. 1
Well aware of the judicial interpretation of Section 20 of the Clayton Act,58
the drafters took especial care to supply full definitions of "labor disputes," 0
to omit the vexatious word "lawful,"0G' and to specify that no injunction
should issue because those participating in a labor dispute "are engaged in an
unlawful combination or conspiracy because of the doing in concert of the
things enumerated . . . ",61 Although injunctions may issue where neces-
52. N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 39-40 (1937).
53. See Blankenship v. Kurfman, 96 F. (2d) 450 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938).
54. This discussion has related solely to jurisdiction. Even if the activity were held
within the scope of the act, however, the court could still find that it was a reasonable
restraint. See note 97 infra.
55. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. §§ 101-115 (1934). The act is discussed in
FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930) 208 et seq.
56. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 103 (1934).
57. Private suits for injunctions were made available by § 16 of the Clayton Act, 38
STAT. 737 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §26 (1934). Cf. Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U. S.
459 (1917). Berman's figures indicate that such suits constituted more than half of all
actions instituted under the Sherman Act after the passage of the Clayton Act, and more
than three-fifths of all suits brought under the Anti-Trust Law. More than four-fifths of
these suits were successful. BERMrAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN ACT (1930) 219; see
Shulman, Book Review (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 831, 832. In probably two-thirds of the
labor cases in the federal courts, however, diversity of citizenship is the sole basis of
jurisdiction. FRANKFURMR AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930) 210. For
treatment of the problem of the effectiveness of labor injunctions, see FRANKFURTER AN1D
GREENE, at 82 et seq.; WITE, THE GOVERNIMENT IN LABOR DISPUTES (1932), 111 et seq.
58. "The legislative history of the Act demonstrates that it was the purpose of Con-
gress further to extend the prohibitions of the Clayton Act respecting the exercise of
jurisdiction by the federal courts and to obviate the results of the judicial construction
of that act." New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery, Inc., 303 U. S. 552, 562 (1938).
59. See note 2 supra.
60. The Court, in the Duplex case, used "lawful" as a further means of weakening
§20. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 473 (1921).
61. 47 STAT. 71 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 105 (1934). This section probably applies to
Sherman Act conspiracies as well as common law conspiracies. See discussion of Sher-
man Act cases in H. R. REP. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) 8.
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sary to protect property against damage from force and violence,02 this
jurisdictional loophole is well guarded by the requirements of a showing of
damage and of attempts to settle,ca and by the various procedural safety
devices.64
The liberal scope given to the term "labor dispute" by the Supreme Court
is indicative of the full effect that will be given the Norris-LaGuardia Act.0
Although not as yet fully tested in its Sherman Act aspects, it is probably
broad enough to cover such situations as fit within the loose category of
"secondary boycotts." In Wilson and Company v. Birl, the district court
refused, on the basis of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, to grant an injunction
against activities which included asking plaintiff's customers not to purchase
his goods, followed by actual picketing in a few cases where the customer
rejected the demand.60 In Paidy Jail Building Company v. Intcrnatlional
Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, another
district court, in holding that the efforts of a minority union to obtain a
collective bargaining agreement constituted a conspiracy under the Sherman
Act, issued an injunction against fraudulent representations that they con-
stituted a majority. But the court expressly refused, on grounds of the
Anti-Injunction Act, to enjoin the union from agreeing with others to quit
the employ of the purchasers of plaintiff's products."- Both of these cases
represent a refusal to enjoin a type of activity previously held punishable
under the Sherman Act.6" But, as is apparent, they are no authority for
holding such activities legal or reasonable under the Sherman Act. The
Norris-LaGuardia Act deals only with the procedure of the federal courts,
not with substantive law.69 Nevertheless, it indicates a realization and appre-
62. 47 STAT. 71 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 107 (1934).
63. 47 STAT. 72 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 108 (1934).
64. 47 STAT. 72 (1932), 29 U. S. C. §§ 109, 110, 111, 112.
65. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U. S. 46S (1937); Lauf v. Shinner &
Co., 303 U. S. 323 (1938); New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery, Inc., 303 U. S.
552 (1938), amended, 304 U. S. 542 (1938). See (1937) 37 CoL- L. Ray. 1-7; (193S)
5 U. OF CHL L. REV. 689; (193S) 86 U. or P.%. L. RE%,. 784.
66. 27 F. Supp. 915 (E. D. Pa. 1939).
67. 29 F. Supp. 15 (E. D. Mo. 1939).
68. See note 16 supra; ef. Terrio v. S. N. Nielson Construction Co., 5 Lim. Rx. REP.
271 (E. D. La. 1939); Mayo v. Dean, 82 F. (2d) 554 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935); Fehr Baking
Co. v. Bakers' Union, 20 F. Supp. 691 (NV. D. La. 1937).
69. Section 1, 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 101 (1934); §4, 47 STAT. 70 (19l2),
29 U. S. C. § 104 (1934). However, § 20 of the Clayton Act, which states: ". . . nor
shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be considered or held to be violations of
any law of the United States," evidently was designed to affect substantive, as vell as
procedural law. 38 STAT. 738 (1914), 29 U. S. C. § 52 (1934). In holding that this sec-
tion did not legalize the "secondary boycott," the majority in the Duplex case supple-
mented their reasoning with Congressional reports. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deer-
ing, 254 U. S. 443, 474 et scq. (1921). Brandeis, Holmes, and Clarke dissented, declar-
ing that Congress had legalized such acts as complained of in the case. Id. at 437-423.
It would be possible-but very doubtful-for the Supreme Court, in passing upon a
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ciation of labor's objectives, and crystallizes a trend to keep labor out of
the courts when engaged in union activities.
Despite this protection,70 labor is still threatened by private action under
the Sherman Act in the form of a treble damage sUit.71 By express rulings
of the Supreme Court, both the unincorporated union 7 2 and its individual
members7 3 are liable to a damage action under the Anti-Trust Law,.74 Partly
because the injunction was so quick and so thorough a remedy, there have
been but few treble damage suits in the past.75 Those that were successfully
prosecuted dragged on in the courts for years and finally resulted in actual
recovery of comparatively small damagesJ,° Notwithstanding these discour-
aging results, the number of treble damage suits is on the increase.7 Haunted
similar set of facts today, to adopt the Brandeis reasoning. Brandeis, himself, failed to
utilize it in his later Bedford Stone dissent. Such a decision would, in effect, lift the
judicial ban so far as usual labor practices are concerned. See note 4 supra.
70. See Sayre, Labor and the Courts (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 682.
71. §7, 26 STAT. 210 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 15, n. (1934). See Comment (1939)
49 YALE L. J. 284 for a discussion of the methods of anti-trust prosecution.
72. United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Co., 259 U. S. 344 (1922).
See LANDIS, CASES ox LABOR LAW (1934 ed. and 1937 Supp.) 570, n. 2; VARRN, Cor-
PoRATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORPORATION (1929), 648-70; McDonough, Liability of
an Unincorporated Labor Union Under the Sherman Law (1924) 10 VA. L. REv. 304,
73. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 (1908); Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U. S. 522 (1915).
See WInrE, THE GOVERNMENT IN LABOR DispuT rs (1932) 144 et seq.
74. Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 STAT. 71 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 106
(1934), states: "No officer or member of any association or organization, and no asso-
ciation or organization participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be held respon-
sible or liable in any court of the United States for the unlawful acts of individual offic-
ers, members, or agents, except upon clear proof of actual participation in, or of actual
authorization of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual knowledge thereof."
This section has been dealt with in Mayo v. Dean, 82 F. (2d) 554, 556 (C. C. A. 5th,
1936) ; Cinderella Theater Co., Inc. v. Sign Writers' Local Union No. 591, 6 F. Supp.
164 (E. D. Mich. 1934).
75. Berman lists only five cases, of which the Danbury Hatters case (Loewe v. Law-
lor) and the second Coronado case were successful. BERMAN, LABOR AND TIIE SIIERnMAN
Acr (1930), 300-305. It has been held that damages cannot be recovered in the same
action in which an injunction is asked. Decorative Stone Co. v. Bldg. Trades Council,
23 F. (2d) 426 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), cert. denied, 277 U. S. 594 (1928). The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure will probably affect this holding.
76. The Danbury Hatters case was in the courts for fourteen years and was finally
settled in 1917 for a little over $234,000, $216,000 of which was supplied by the AFL. The
second Coronado case was in the federal courts from 1914-1927, and was finally settled
for $27,500, but the company had to pay its own costs amounting to over $100,000. WITr,
op. cit. supra note 73, 134 et seq.; LANDIS, Op. cit. supra note 72, at 531, n. 1. § 6 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act has placed another barrier in the path of such suits by requiring
stricter application of the doctrines of agency.
77. In the notorious Apex case, the company prosecuted its treble damage suit after a
sit-down strike had already been enjoined and the controversy settled. The judgment for
$237,000 (over $700,000 when trebled) in the District Court was recently reversed. See
note 42 supra. The suits by Republic Steel against the CIO for $7,500,000 and by three
New England Trucking Companies against the Teamsters' Union for $990,000 are still
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by the desolate picture of the Danbury Hatters, whose homes were attached
in execution of a judgment for treble damages, labor might well abandon
a boycott under threat of such a suit long before the courts pronounced the
particular activity illegal. Moreover, once a substantial judgment for damages
is obtained, it can serve both as a weapon for compelling concessions and
as a means of draining a union's strength. In view of the uncertainties
inherent in obtaining a jury verdict and of the expenses of litigation, however,
it seems unlikely that employers will push this remedy very far. Nevertheless,
the treble damage suit remains a thinly concealed threat to the ranks of
labor.
Although few would sanction so drastic a remedy as treble damages, a
majority of the public today have strong ideas on the curbing of union
excesses. A Gallup poll indicates that 79% of the interviewed voters favor
increased government control of labor unions to protect the public from
violence and disorder.7s Yet 74% of these voters favor the principles of
unionism. Such figures highlight the curious combination of factors that
make up the public attitude toward labor. The establishment of a Wagner
Act,79 the promulgation of anti-injunction 0 and anti-strikebreaking statutes,8 '
the declarations of public policy in favor of collective bargaining6- are all
important indicia of a public sympathy with labor objectives.83 But the
pendulum has recently begun to swing the other way, induced in large part
by the AFL-CIO schism and by the jurisdictional disputes within the ranks
of the AFL. This public reaction, which has set in against bickering and
violence, may eventually translate itself into an anti-union policy.
Against this background of conflicting legal doctrine and mixed public
opinion, the re-invigorated and expertly trained Anti-Trust Division has
attempted to trace a consistent labor policy.84 The first move was to launch
pending. (1939) 4 L . Rim. REP. 467. In Republic Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 5 La.
REL. REP. 266 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939), the court upheld the Board's reinstatement and back-
pay orders, which concerned the controversy out of which the treble damage suit arose.
78. N. Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1939, p. 21, col. 1.
79. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 151-165 (Supp. 1938).
80. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. §§ 101-115 (1934).
81. 49 STAT. 1899 (1936), as amended 52 STAT. 1242 (1938), 18 U. S. C. 407a (Supp.
1938).
82. Section 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 103
(1934); § 1 of the Wagner Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 151 (Supp. 1938).
§ 13 of the Wagner Act, 49 STAT. 457 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 163 (Supp. 1938), states:
"Nothing in this Act shall be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in
any w -ay the right to strike."
83. The shift in the common law in favor of labor is reflected in RE5ATrmEm, TO.rrs(1939) §§ 775-816. See also Hellerstein, Secondary Boycotts in Laor Disputes (1938)
47 YALE L. j. 341. When an action is brought under the Sherman Act, however, Erie R.
R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938) does not apply.
84. "It is my belief that under the present laws the most effective deterrent lies on
the criminal side of the court, in so far as the prevention of illegal practices is con-
cerned." Arnold, Fair and Effective Use of Present Anti-Trust Proccdure (1938) 47
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its cleanup of the building trades industry by obtaining indictments" against
labor unions in six different cities.86 Striking at jurisdictional disputes, the
Washington8 7 and St. Louis88 indictments charge a conspiracy to coerce
an employer to violate a contract with one group of employees and to replace
them with another group. The other indictments, aimed against combinations
of employers and labor unions, charge a conspiracy to "police" the industry,
carry on collusive bidding and fix prices.8 9 Although the Government has
brought approximately thirteen suits for injunctions and over thirty suits
for indictments against labor,90 these present indictments represent the first
incursion of the Anti-Trust Division into the field of jurisdictional disputes.91
YALE L. J. 1294, 1299. The Government has recently secured at least two convictions and
two consent decrees in criminal actions against unions and union officials. United States
v. Internat'l Fur Workers' Union of United States and Canada, 100 F. (2d) 541 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1938) ; United States v. Anderson, 101 F. (2d) 325 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939), cert. de-
nied, 59 S. C. 822 (1939); United States v. Local 807 of Internat'l Bro. of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Stablemen, and Helpers of America, 1 Prentice-Hall Labor Serv. 1 362 (S.
D. N. Y. 1939) (consent decree); United States v. Wine, Liquor, and Distillery Work-
ers Union No. 20244, 5 LAB. REL. REP. 273 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
85. Section 3, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 3 (1934), provides for a maximum
penalty of a $5,000 fine, a year in jail, or both. Several criminal suits have been brought
against individuals for illegitimate labor activities. There have been less indictments
against unions, but it seems clear that the unincorporated association is indictable in its
own name. Brown v. United States, 276 U. S. 134, 142 (1928); United States v. Inter-
national Fur Workers Union of United States and Canada, 100 F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A.
2d, 1938).
86. Teamsters Union in Washington; Carpenters Union in St. Louis; Electrical
Workers Union in Pittsburgh; Glaziers Union in Cleveland; Bricklayers Union in De-
troit; Electrical Workers Union in San Francisco.
87. N. Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1939, p. 1, col. 2. Although it is reported that the unions
have settled their dispute in Washington, the Government is continuing to prosecute its
action. (1939) 5 LAB. REL. REP. 223.
88. N. Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1939, p. 13, col. 5.
89. N. Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1939, p. 13, col. 5; N. Y. Times, Dec. 6,1939, p. 19, col. 2;
N. Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1939, p. 27, col. 2; (1939) 5 LAB. REL. REP. 318.
90. These approximate figures have been derived from the cases cited in (1938)
THE FEDERAL A iTi-TRUST LAWS (published by the Department of Justice), and the
cases, reported and unreported, arising after January, 1938, but not including the pend-
ing indictments. Although the case has been counted as a unit, in some instances two
or more cases arose from the same controversy.
91. In obtaining injunctions or consent decrees in a large majority of the equity
cases and convictions in over half of the criminal suits, the Government has been success-
ful in branding as an illegal conspiracy several types of labor activity. O'Brien v. United
States, 290 Fed. 185 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923) (interference with the actual transportation
of goods) ; Clements v. United States, 297 Fed. 206 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924) (interferences
with railway traffic); Williams v. United States, 295 Fed. 302 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923)
(sabotage of instrumentalities of commerce) ; United States v. Local 807, 1 Prentice-Hall
Labor Serv. 11362 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) (racketeering activities); United States v. Jour-
neymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, THE FEDERAL ANTi-TRuST LAWS 220 (1929) (refusal to
work on non-union product) ; United States v. Painters' District Council, 44 F. (2d) 58
(N. D. Ill. 1930), aff'd per curim, 284 U. S. 582 (1931) (refusal to handle wholly fin-
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Perspective for viewing the present indictments as a reflection of the
Division's labor policy is acquired by a consideration of the Justice Depart-
ment's general intention to free commerce of all restraints of trade - whether
imposed by big business men,92 little business menY3 doctors' associations,"
or labor unions -in the interests of the consumer and of the preservation
of free competitiqn. Consequently, when a union engages in practices which
exceed the ambit of "legitimate," it oversteps its privilege and becomes
subject to prosecution for having unduly raised costs and restricted the flow
of commerce. 95 This policy has been sharply outlined in the recent letter
of the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Anti-Trust Division.
While denying any intention to "police strikes or adjudicate labor contro-
versies," he plans to prosecute certain activities which have no "reasonable
connection with such legitimate objects as wages, hours, safety, health, undue
speeding up or the right to collective bargaining," and cannot be classified
as "legitimate" even within the scope of the dissenting opinions of the Duplex
and Bedford cases. He has defined these illegitimate activities to include:
(1) efforts to prevent the use of cheaper materials, improved equipment, or
improved methods; (2) attempts to compel the hiring of useless and unnec-
essary labor; (3) extortion and graft; (4) combinations to enforce illegally
fixed prices; (5) jurisdictional strikes to upset an established system of
collective bargaining.90
Mr. Arnold's letter reflects public sentiment to an anazing degree. By
disregarding requests to proceeds against strikes for better conditions and
against refusals to handle non-union goods, the Division has, in part at least,
adopted a "rule of reason" toward labor objectives which saves the Sherman
Act from being completely anachronistic.07 In all probability, this departure
ished products); United States v. Brims, 272 U. S. 549 (1926) (agreements ,ith em-
ployers to discriminate against non-union, out of state materials); Local 167 %. United
States, 291 U. S. 293 (1934) (agreements with employers to tie up the industry and dis-
criminate against non-union employers). In National Ass'n of Window Glass Mfrs. v.
United States, 263 U. S. 403 (1923), an agreement with the employers to stagger output
was upheld as a reasonable restraint. See note 19 supro.
92. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, Equity No. 85-73 (S. D. N. Y. 1939)
(being argued).
93. United States v. Imperial Wood Stick Co., Inc., Prentice-Hall Fed. Trade &
Ind. Serv. 127,202 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
94. United States v. American Medical Association, 28 F. Supp. 752 (D. D. C. 1939).
95. The contravention of public as well as employer interest by labor activity finds
immunity in the doctrine of damums absque injuria, the damage being justified by the
purpose. This doctrine was developed by Justice Holmes in his article, Prftilege, Malice,
and Intent (1894) 8 HAnv. L. REV. 1, and in his decisions in Vegelam v. Guntner, 167
Mass. 92 (1896); Plant v. Woods, 176 Afass. 492 (1900); Aikens ,. Wisconsin, 195
U. S. 194 (1904). See discussion in FSAxxFLURTmf AND Gnssii, Tim L a. IzNiUcNron
(1930) 24 et seq.
96. Letter of Assistant Attorney General Thurman Arnold to the Secretary of the
Central Labor Union of Indianapolis, N. Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1939, p. 1, col. 4.
97. The point of departure for a legal appraisal of union activities in terms of
economic and social factors has already been indicated by the dissents of Justice Brandeis.
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from majority doctrine anticipates the direction of judicial opinion. Prosecu-
tion of racketeering activities of so-called union officials undoubtedly has
public and judicial sanction; but it would seem that a more desirable instru-
ment than the Sherman Act is a law specifically designed to meet the situation
- the Anti-Racketeering Act.98  No one would dispute the role of the
Division in proceeding against combinations of unions and. employers whose
purpose is to foster collusive bidding and to freeze out competitorsY On a
much different level, however, is the classification of jurisdictional disputes, 10 0
refusals to handle factory finished products, and demands for more working-
men as "unreasonable restraints." Often economically indefensible, working
hardship on innocent employers and the subject of much censure today,
these controversies nevertheless involve grave questions of policy, with
much to be said on the side of labor.101 The unions are attempting to main-
tain and increase their strength, to maintain their standards, or to share
equitably in the profits of production.10 2 The reality to be faced in this
conflict is that their objectives can be gained only by "combining" to "restrain"
With the proximity of interest of the striking employees to the controversy as the basic
element, social and economic factors can be spelled out in the relative strengths of the
employees and the union, in the balance of benefits and harmful consequences to society.
If applied by the courts, such an approach would have the distinct advantage of piercing
the fog of "direct" restraints and bringing into the clear the social motivation for the
decision. But this is not to suggest that a judge, however, devoted to the cause of labor,
should impose his theory of the good economic life on the vital controversies before his
bar of justice. Reasonableness lies in the mores of the community, in legislative enact-
ment, and in public opinion.
98. 48 STAT. 979, 18 U. S. C. §§ 420a-420e (1934).
99. Combinations of unions with employers are not bad per se. Cf. National Ass'n of
Window Glass Mfrs. v. United States, 263 U. S. 403 (1923), discussed in note 19 supra.
The courts will have to look to the purpose of the agreement, its effects on the industry,
and its possible justifications.
100. Jurisdictional disputes at present are the cause of great concern to both friend
and foe of labor. They have raised knotty legal problems. See BRooKs, UNIONS OF
THEIR OWN CHOOSING (1939); (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1053 (inter-union disputes);
(1939) 49 YALE L. J. 329 (intra-union disputes).
101. There have been but few jurisdictional dispute cases brought under the Sherman
Act. Rockwood Corp. of St. Louis v. Bricklayers' Local Union, No. 1, 33 F. (2d) 25
(C. C. A. 8th, 1929), cert. denied, 280 U. S. 575 (1929), involving a dispute between
bricklayers and carpenters, was turned off on the grounds that there was no conspiracy
because only a single person was responsible, and that, even if there was a conspiracy,
the effect on interstate commerce was indirect. The most recent case, Terrio v. S. N.
Nielson Construction Co., 5 LAB. REL. REP. 271, (E. D. La. 1939), explicitly holds that
the AFL union, in striking to compel replacement of CIO drivers, was "lawfully carrying
out the legitimate objects." Cf. Blankenship v. Kurfman, 96 F. (2d) 450 (C. C. A. 7th,
1938) ; Pauly Jail Bldg. Co. v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental
Iron Workers, 29 F. Supp. 15 (E. D. Mo. 1939). The lower courts have condemned
refusals to handle wholly finished products. United States v. Painters District Council,
44 F. (2d) 58 (N. D. Ill. 1930), aff'd per curam, 284 U. S. 582 (1931).
102. See The Folklaw of Thurman Amold (1939) 8 INT. JURID. Ass'N BULL. 53,
62 et seq.
(Vol. 49 : 518
LABOR AND THE SHERMAN ACT
the employer's business. Their victories, if won over conference tables, are
inspired by visions of the picket lines.
As a matter of policy, many activities which constitute a restraint of trade
are not best, or even properly, dealt with by means of the Anti-Trust Law. 03
From the extreme case in which a holdup man restrains trade by stopping
and robbing a freight car, it is obvious that the nature of the activity is
important in determining whether the Sherman Act, rather than some other
law, contains the sanction which should be applied.'0 4 The entire industrial
history of America has been marked by conflict between employer and
employee interests, as well as by opposing claims within the body of labor
itself. When such crucial and delicate problems of human conduct are in-
volved, when detailed statutes and expert administrative boards have been
set up to cope with the issues,105 the wisdom of applying an act which entrusts
policy to a Division concerned primarily with activities of capital, and which
leaves determination of the boundaries of "legitimate objects" to courts
with only the words "conspiracy in restraint of trade" to guide them, is
highly dubious. 0 6 This becomes even more apparent in the light of past
uncertainties of judicial opinion.107
Through its present policy, the Division - despite its claim - largely takes
upon itself the function of "adjudicating" the issues of these controversies.
By stepping in with an indictment, the Division tips the balance, and often
by that very act determines questions which should be worked out by labor
103. The problems that the Anti-Trust Division will have to face in getting juris-
diction under the Sherman Act on grounds of a restraint of interstate commerce are
not discussed here, principally because sufficient information is not available. Cases
like Industrial Ass'n of San Francisco v. United States, 263 U. S. 64 (1925) and
Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U. S. 103 (1933) will have to be met and
distinguished. It has been indirectly indicated that the Anti-Trust Division does not
favor the extended concept of interstate commerce sought in the Apex case. See letter of
William Green to Attorney General Murphy in N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1939, p. 30, col. 4.
104. Cases of violence and sabotage seem to call for local criminal sanctions rather
than the Anti-Trust law. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 5 LmA. Rsr. Ru. 375 (C. C. A.
3d, 1939) ; (1939) 39 CoL L. Rv. 1247, 1250.
105. Cf. NATioNAL LAnoR Rm ToNS Acr, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 279 U. S. C. §§ 151-
166 (Supp. 1938).
106. It has often been proposed that the Sherman Act be specifically amended so as to
exclude labor from its operation. Apex Echo (1939) 4 LAn. REL REP. 379; cf. TArT,
THE AN-TI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPRFZSE COURT (1914) 93. Legislation, other than the
Clayton Act, has in the past been introduced into Congress, designed to exempt unions.
FRA-iN-KFuRTE AND Gpxasn, op. cit. supra note 95, 139 et seq.
107. "This fact that the Sherman Act puts upon courts the task of making law without
any clear guidance from Congress or the constitution is sufficiently patent from the
differences of opinion between the Supreme Court and its subordinates in the cases here
reviewed. If we may judge from the record of the past three years, the lower courts
seem to have a genius for not divining what their august superiors will decide and
determine." Powell, Comnerce, Congress, and the Supreme Court (1926) 26 CoL- L.
REv. 521, 545. See also discussion in B~mumr, LAoR AND THE SHUMuxAN, LAW (1930)
224 et seq.; FRANKrURTFR AND GREnxn, THE L,=oR Imr-uncrom (1930) 169.
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itself or by an expert labor board. From the standpoint of technique, govern-
ment of labor relations by criminal indictment is as much a solecism as
"government by injunction." A realization of the deficiencies of the Sherman
Act as a labor statute' 0 8 should require the Division to restrict further its
interference to situations where the activities are non-union or flatly dis-
honest.'0 9
Despite its claims of benefit to responsible labor," 0 the announced policy
has dangerous implications. Aggressive public action against labor will
probably bear fruit in an increased number of private suits against all types
of union activities. Successful or not, they are almost sure to hinder col-
lective bargaining. The Department's determination to operate within the
limits of even the dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court", is no guarantee
that district courts will feel themselves so bound. Likewise, a division drive
against labor activities is a dangerous precedent in itself for future anti-trust
prosecutors, perhaps less aware than the present Division of the values of
collective bargaining.
If some action is necessary to curb union excesses, the most satisfactory
solution would be legislative enactments directed specifically toward the
labor situation. The National Labor Relations Board seems the logical body
to handle such enactments. 1 2 Provisions granting broad discretionary power
to determine "unfair practices" in jurisdictional disputes, or to delimit the
practices in which unions may engage, would provide the flexibility necessary
for adequate treatment of these living issues.'13 Judicial enforcement of
108. Both Witte and Terborgh have termed the Sherman Act a "menace" to labor.
Wrr, op. cit. supra note 73, at 74; Terborgh, loc. cit. supra note 37, at 204. Indeed it
would seem that the application of the Anti-Trust Law to collective bargaining has
resulted in the stunting of a movement that should have been allowed scope in order to
maintain a maturity free from violence. Nevertheless, the retarded growth of unionism
in the United States has doubtless been more the fault of economic forces and of union
leadership, than of court decisions. See Frankfurter, Foreword to BERMAN, LABOR ANn
THE SHERMAN ACT (1930) XIV; Wirra, op. cit. supra note 72, at 74; Wolman, Can
Uncle Sam Organize Laborf (1936) 93 REviw OF REvIEws 31.
109. As a matter of administrative discretion, there are doubtless several other abuses
of the competitive process on which the Division could concentrate attention. Cf. letter
of Attorney General Murphy to William Green, N. Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1939, p. 1, col. 1.
If the Sherman Act is to be applied at all to unions when acting for union purposes, a
court mindful of the vagueness of the act and of the proper limits of its lawmaking
function should apply an explicit "rule of reason." See note 97 supra.
110. N. Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1939, p. 1, col. 4.
111. Ibid.
112. The NLRB has so far refused to take jurisdiction of intra-Federation disputes.
See Comment, The Influeiwe of the National Labor Relations Board upon Inter-Union
Disputes (1938) 38 CoL. L. REv. 1243.
113. The difficulties of getting legislative action are well recognized. This is scarcely
a warrant for the Division to step in and clean house. Although, in the interval, innocent
employers and the public will be caught between the warring factions, it can only be
answered that such has been the case for several years. It has been suggested that the
present campaign is simply a tactical effort to stop union bickering.
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